

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GUADALUPE RAMIRIEZ,	:	CONSOLIDATED UNDER
	:	MDL 875
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	Transferred from the
	:	Northern District of
v.	:	California
	:	(Case No. 11-01031)
	:	
METALCLAD INSULATION CORP	:	E.D. PA CIVIL ACTION NO.
ET AL.,	:	2:11-64225-ER
Defendants.	:	

**FILED**

NOV - 9 2012

MICHAEL E. KUNZ, Clerk  
By \_\_\_\_\_ Dep. Clerk  
ORDER

**AND NOW**, this **8th** day of **November**, **2012**, it is hereby **ORDERED** that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant General Dynamics Corporation (Doc. No. 17) is **DENIED**.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This case was transferred in April of 2011 from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of MDL-875.

Plaintiffs are wrongful death heirs and successors-in-interest to Raul Ramirez ("Decedent" or "Mr. Ramirez"). Plaintiffs allege that Decedent was exposed to asbestos while working aboard ships at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, California during the period 1983 to 1991. Defendant General Dynamics ("General Dynamics") built ships. The alleged exposure pertinent to Defendant General Dynamics occurred during Decedent's work aboard numerous ships.

Plaintiffs assert that Decedent developed asbestos-related disease as a result of asbestos exposure.

Plaintiffs brought claims against various defendants. Defendant General Dynamics has moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) it is immune from liability by way of the government contractor defense, and (2) it is entitled to summary judgment on grounds of the sophisticated user defense. The parties assert that California law applies.

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**I. Legal Standard**

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by 'the mere existence' of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact." Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In undertaking this analysis, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. "After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)). While the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving party who must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

B. The Applicable Law

1. Government Contractor Defense (Federal Law)

Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the government contractor defense is governed by federal law. In matters of federal law, the MDL transferee court applies the law of the circuit where it sits, which in this case is the law of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Various Plaintiffs v. Various Defendants ("Oil Field Cases"), 673 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362-63 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (Robreno, J.).

2. State Law Issues (Maritime versus State Law)

The parties assert that California law applies.

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However, where a case sounds in admiralty, application of a state's law (including a choice of law analysis under its choice of law rules) would be inappropriate. Gibbs ex rel. Gibbs v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 314 F.3d 125, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, if the Court determines that maritime law is applicable, the analysis ends there and the Court is to apply maritime law. See id.

Whether maritime law is applicable is a threshold dispute that is a question of federal law, see U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), and is therefore governed by the law of the circuit in which this MDL court sits. See Various Plaintiffs v. Various Defendants ("Oil Field Cases"), 673 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (Robreno, J.). This court has previously set forth guidance on this issue. See Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (Robreno, J.).

In order for maritime law to apply, a plaintiff's exposure underlying a products liability claim must meet both a locality test and a connection test. Id. at 463-66 (discussing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995)). The locality test requires that the tort occur on navigable waters or, for injuries suffered on land, that the injury be caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Id. In assessing whether work was on "navigable waters" (i.e., was sea-based) it is important to note that work performed aboard a ship that is docked at the shipyard is sea-based work, performed on navigable waters. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990). This Court has previously clarified that this includes work aboard a ship that is in "dry dock." See Deuber v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., No. 10-78931, 2011 WL 6415339, at \*1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2011) (Robreno, J.) (applying maritime law to ship in "dry dock" for overhaul). By contrast, work performed in other areas of the shipyard or on a dock, (such as work performed at a machine shop in the shipyard, for example, as was the case with the Willis plaintiff discussed in Conner) is land-based work. The connection test requires that the incident could have "a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce," and that "the general character" of the "activity giving rise to the incident" shows a "substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364, 365, and n.2).

#### Locality Test

If a service member in the Navy performed some work at shipyards (on land) or docks (on land) as opposed to

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onboard a ship on navigable waters (which includes a ship docked at the shipyard, and includes those in "dry dock"), "the locality test is satisfied as long as some portion of the asbestos exposure occurred on a vessel on navigable waters." Conner, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 466; Deuber, 2011 WL 6415339, at \*1 n.1. If, however, the worker never sustained asbestos exposure onboard a vessel on navigable waters, then the locality test is not met and state law applies.

#### Connection Test

When a worker whose claims meet the locality test was primarily sea-based during the asbestos exposure, those claims will almost always meet the connection test necessary for the application of maritime law. Conner, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 467-69 (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534). This is particularly true in cases in which the exposure has arisen as a result of work aboard Navy vessels, either by Navy personnel or shipyard workers. See id. But if the worker's exposure was primarily land-based, then, even if the claims could meet the locality test, they do not meet the connection test and state law (rather than maritime law) applies. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent was exposed to asbestos while working aboard ships at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard. Defendant asserts that there is no evidence in the record to establish that maritime law is applicable to Plaintiff's claims against it. However, all of the evidence in the record pertaining to asbestos-containing products indicates that the asbestos was located aboard Navy vessels. (See, e.g., Pl. Exs. C and D (deposition testimony of Admiral Horne, discussing asbestos-containing insulation aboard ships).)

There is no evidence in the record of asbestos-containing products located at (or exposure by Plaintiff to asbestos at) any location other than aboard those ships, including on land in California. Accordingly, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence in the record is that (as Plaintiff alleges), any asbestos exposure pertinent to Defendant General Dynamics occurred during sea-based work. See Conner, 799 F. Supp. 2d 455. Accordingly, maritime law is applicable to Plaintiff's claims against General Dynamics. See id. at 462-63.

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C. Government Contractor Defense

To satisfy the government contractor defense, a defendant must show that (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications for the product at issue; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) it warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to it but not to the United States. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). As to the first and second prongs, in a failure to warn context, it is not enough for defendant to show that a certain product design conflicts with state law requiring warnings. In re Joint E. & S.D.N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the defendant must show that the government "issued reasonably precise specifications covering warnings-specifications that reflect a considered judgment about the warnings at issue." Hagen v. Benjamin Foster Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 770, 783 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Robreno, J.) (citing Holdren v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 129, 143 (D. Mass. 2009)). Government approval of warnings must "transcend rubber stamping" to allow a defendant to be shielded from state law liability. 739 F. Supp. 2d at 783. This Court has previously cited to the case of Beaver Valley Power Co. v. Nat'l Engineering & Contracting Co., 883 F.2d 1210, 1216 (3d Cir. 1989), for the proposition that the third prong of the government contractor defense may be established by showing that the government "knew as much or more than the defendant contractor about the hazards" of the product. See, e.g., Willis v. BW IP Int'l, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) (Robreno, J.); Dalton v. 3M Co., No. 10-64604, 2011 WL 5881011, at \*1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2011) (Robreno, J.). Although this case is persuasive, as it was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, it is not controlling law in this case because it applied Pennsylvania law. Additionally, although it was decided subsequent to Boyle, the Third Circuit neither relied upon, nor cited to, Boyle in its opinion.

D. Government Contractor Defense at Summary Judgment Stage

This Court has noted that, at the summary judgment stage, a defendant asserting the government contractor defense has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding whether it is entitled to the government contractor defense. Compare Willis, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (addressing defendant's burden at the summary judgment stage), with Hagen, 739 F. Supp. 2d 770 (addressing defendant's

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burden when Plaintiff has moved to remand). In Willis, the MDL Court found that defendants had not proven the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact as to prong one of the Boyle test since plaintiff had submitted affidavits controverting defendants' affidavits as to whether the Navy issued reasonably precise specifications as to warnings which were to be placed on defendants' products. The MDL Court distinguished Willis from Faddish v. General Electric Co., No. 09-70626, 2010 WL 4146108 at \*8-9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2010) (Robreno, J.), where the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence of their own to contradict defendants' proofs. Ordinarily, because of the standard applied at the summary judgment stage, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the government contractor defense.

#### E. Sophisticated User Defense Under Maritime Law

This Court has previously held that a manufacturer or supplier of a product has no duty to warn an end user who is "sophisticated" regarding the hazards of that product. Mack v. General Electric Co., No. 10-78940, 2012 WL 4717918, at \*1, 6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2012) (Robreno, J.). In doing so, the Court held that the sophistication of an intermediary (or employer) - or the warning of that intermediary (or employer) by a manufacturer or supplier - does not preclude potential liability of the manufacturer or supplier. Id. at \*6-8. As set forth in Mack, a "sophisticated user" is an end user who either knew or belonged to a class of users who, by virtue of training, education, or employment could reasonably be expected to know of the hazards of the product at issue. Id. at \*8. When established, the defense is a bar only to negligent failure to warn claims (and is not a bar to strict product liability claims). Id.

## II. Defendant General Dynamics's Motion for Summary Judgment

### A. Defendant's Arguments

#### Government Contractor Defense

General Dynamics asserts the government contractor defense, arguing that it is immune from liability in this case, and therefore entitled to summary judgment, because the Navy exercised discretion and approved reasonably precise specifications for the products at issue, Defendants provided warnings that conformed to the Navy's approved warnings, and the Navy knew about the hazards of asbestos. In asserting this

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defense, General Dynamics relies upon the affidavit of Admiral David Sargent and Captain Thomas McCaffery.

### Sophisticated User Defense

General Dynamics asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the sophisticated user defense because the Navy was a sophisticated user. In asserting this defense, it cites to Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., 43 Cal.4th 56 (Cal. 2008), and relies again upon the affidavit of Admiral Sargent to establish that the Navy "maintained superior knowledge regarding the hazards of asbestos."

## **B. Plaintiff's Arguments**

### Government Contractor Defense

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment in favor of Defendant on grounds of the government contractor defense is not warranted because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding its availability to Defendant. Plaintiff contends that Defendant has (1) not produced its contract with the government or otherwise proven that it was a government contractor, (2) not demonstrated that the product at issue was "military equipment," and (3) not demonstrated a genuine significant conflict between state tort law and fulfilling its contractual federal obligations (i.e., that its contractual duties were "precisely contrary" to its duties under state tort law). Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the government contractor defense is not warranted because (4) SEANAV Instruction 6260.005 makes clear that the Navy encouraged Defendant to warn, (5) military specifications merely "rubber stamped" whatever warnings Defendant elected to use (or not use) and do not reflect a considered judgment by the Navy, (6) there is no military specification that precluded warning about asbestos hazards, and (7) Defendant cannot demonstrate what the Navy knew about the hazards of asbestos relative to the knowledge of Defendant, nor that the Navy knew more than it did at the time of the alleged exposure.

To contradict the evidence relied upon by Defendant, Plaintiff cites to (a) MIL-M-15071D, and (b) SEANAV Instruction 6260.005, each of which Plaintiff contends indicates that the Navy not only permitted but expressly required warnings.

Plaintiff has also submitted objections to Defendant's expert evidence pertaining to the government contractor defense.

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Sophisticated User Defense

Plaintiff asserts that General Dynamics is not entitled to summary judgment on grounds of the sophisticated user defense because, (1) General Dynamics has not adduced evidence that Plaintiff was a sophisticated user, and (2) General Dynamics is really arguing for a "sophisticated intermediary defense" (which is not recognized by California law), since Plaintiff merely worked on Navy ships as a (presumably) unsophisticated worker.

**C. Analysis**

Government Contractor Defense

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that it has considered Plaintiff's objections to Defendant's evidence on this issue and has determined that they are without merit. Therefore, the Court will consider Defendant's evidence in deciding its motion regarding this issue.


Plaintiff has pointed to evidence that contradicts (or at least appears to be inconsistent with) General Dynamics's evidence as to whether the Navy did or did not reflect considered judgment over whether warnings could be included with asbestos-containing products. Specifically, Plaintiff has pointed to (a) MIL-M-15071D, and (b) SEANAV Instruction 6260.005, each of which Plaintiff contends indicates that the Navy not only permitted but expressly required warning. This is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether the first and second prongs of the Boyle test are satisfied with respect to General Dynamics. See Willis, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1146. Accordingly, summary judgment on grounds of the government contractor defense is not warranted.

Sophisticated User Defense

Defendant General Dynamics asserts that it is not liable for Plaintiff's injuries because the Navy was sophisticated as to the hazards of asbestos. The Court has previously held that the sophistication of an intermediary (or employer), such as the Navy - or the warning of that intermediary (or employer) by a manufacturer or supplier - does not preclude potential liability of the manufacturer or supplier. Mack, 2012 WL 4717918, at \*6-8. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant General Dynamics is not warranted on grounds of the sophisticated user defense. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-50.

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AND IT IS SO ORDERED.



EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

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**D. Conclusion**

Summary judgment in favor of Defendant General Dynamics on grounds of the government contractor defense is denied because Plaintiff has identified genuine disputes of material fact. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant General Dynamics on grounds of the sophisticated user defense is denied because the sophistication of the Navy does not preclude potential liability of Defendant.