

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

<b>CHRISTINA V. WIMBERLY,</b>	:	<b>CIVIL ACTION</b>
<b>Plaintiff,</b>	:	
	:	
<b>v.</b>	:	<b>NO. 05-2713</b>
	:	
<b>SEVERN TRENT SERVICES, INC.</b>	:	
<b>and SEVERN TRENT WATER</b>	:	
<b>PURIFICATION, INC.,</b>	:	
<b>Defendants.</b>	:	

**MEMORANDUM**

Stengel, J.

February 26, 2007

Plaintiff Christina Wimberly filed this action against Severn Trent Water Purification, Inc. alleging race, sex, and age discrimination. She claimed that Severn Trent changed her direct supervisor, transferred her to a non-managerial position in another unit, and terminated her position for unlawful, discriminatory reasons. In August 2006, I granted the defendant's summary judgment motion in part and dismissed the discrimination claims based upon Wimberly's reporting change. I denied summary judgment on the transfer and termination claims, but I noted that the decision as to those claims was a "close call." See Wimberly v. Severn Trent Service, Inc., 05-2713, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59938 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2006). Based on the record before me at that time, I allowed Wimberly to proceed with the claims because certain unexplained inconsistencies existed regarding the defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions. During the week of February 5, 2007, a jury trial was commenced on the remaining claims. At the close of the plaintiff's case, Severn Trent moved for this

court to enter a judgment as a matter of law against the plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). For the reasons stated on the record at the trial and discussed in more detail below, I granted the defendant's Rule 50(a) motion. The plaintiff offered no evidence at trial that demonstrated Severn Trent acted with the intent to unlawfully discriminate against her. At most, she questioned the wisdom of Severn Trent's business decisions and that is not sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find the defendant liable.

## **I. BACKGROUND<sup>1</sup>**

Severn Trent hired Wimberly in December 1998. Joseph Walsh contacted Wimberly and offered her a position in the Purchasing Department as a Senior Purchasing Agent. Walsh had previously supervised Wimberly at their former employer, CMS Gilbreth, and wished to bring her on board at Severn Trent. Wimberly, who was seeking a change in employment, accepted the position at Severn Trent in part because she felt comfortable with Walsh and Walsh had promised her an eventual promotion to manager. Walsh is the sole decision-maker at Severn Trent that Wimberly claims discriminated against her.

In May 1999, Walsh honored his word and promoted Wimberly to Purchasing Manager. The Purchasing Department bought materials for both the core Gas Feed business and the EP&S division at Severn Trent. As the Purchasing Manager, she oversaw

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<sup>1</sup> I have based this recitation of the facts on the testimony in this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

the other employees in the department, who included Don Gerhart, a Caucasian man born in 1943, and Ellin Stadnycki, a Caucasian woman younger than the plaintiff. In October 2002, Walsh reassigned Wimberly so that she reported to Joseph Tischler. Wimberly maintained her title and salary, but she was no longer a direct report to Walsh.

In July 2003, Severn Trent decided to reorganize its EP&S unit and dedicate a person to handle the division's purchasing function. Walsh decided to transfer Wimberly to the EP&S unit to fill that role because of her purchasing experience. As part of the transfer, Wimberly was demoted. She lost her management position and her entitlement to management bonuses and returned to the title of Senior Purchasing Agent.

In the last quarter of 2003, the EP&S unit experienced a decline in its revenue and earnings. As a result, Severn Trent decided it needed to reduce its costs and it eliminated nine positions at the company (and the salaries associated with those positions).

Wimberly's purchasing position in the EP&S unit was terminated in January of 2004.

Wimberly filed her Complaint with this court and alleged, in connection with her transfer and termination, race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., and race, sex, and age discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951, et seq. against Defendants.

## **II. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 50**

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), I may resolve an issue against a party if that party has been fully heard on the issue during a jury trial and I find that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). If I do resolve an issue against a party, I then may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim that cannot be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue.

“A motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule 50(a) ‘should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be erroneous under the governing law.’” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987)).

"Although judgment as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, a scintilla of evidence is not enough to sustain a verdict of liability. The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party." Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

### **III. DISCUSSION**

#### **A. The McDonnell-Douglas Burden Shifting Framework**

In this case, the plaintiff presented no direct or other sufficient evidence to

demonstrate that race, sex, or age was a motivating factor in Severn Trent’s employment decisions. In other words, this was a “pretext” case, as opposed to a “mixed-motive” case. The plaintiff alleged an improper motive for the defendant’s decisions and the defendant disavowed that motive and contends only non-discriminatory reasons motivated it. See THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1.1 cmt. (2006) (discussing difference between mixed-motive case and pretext case). Therefore, Wimberly’s discrimination claims were analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to disparate treatment race discrimination claims under Title VII, PHRA, and Section 1981); Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 972-74 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADEA and PHRA age claims); Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that PHRA claims are subject to the same analysis as Title VII claims).

Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of discrimination.<sup>2</sup> If the plaintiff is successful with her burden of production, the defendant must then come forward with some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32

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<sup>2</sup>A *prima facie* case requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the adverse job action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797-98 (3d Cir. 2003).

F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). Once a defendant produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff and she must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id. At trial, in order to show pretext, the plaintiff had to put forth sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that her age, sex, and/or race was a *determinative factor* in Severn Trent's decisions. "Determinative factor" means that "but for" the plaintiff's protected status (age, sex, or race) the adverse employment action would not have occurred. See Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2000); Billet v. Cigna Corp., 940 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1991).

A plaintiff can prove that an illegitimate factor was a determinative factor in an employer's decisions in two possible ways. "First, the plaintiff can present evidence that 'casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication.'" Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762). Second, a plaintiff can put forth evidence that "allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action." Id. Under the first prong, the plaintiff must show "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence." Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403,

413 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1997)). It is not enough that a plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant's non-discriminatory reason was wrong, she must show "it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason." Id. (quoting Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109). The plaintiff's burden is to show that "discriminatory animus motivated the employer." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). The soundness or wisdom of the defendant employer's business decisions is not of concern or evidence of pretext. See Atkinson, 460 F.3d at 454 ("The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination." (quotations and citations omitted)).

In its Rule 50(a) motion, Severn Trent did not raise any issue with the plaintiff's establishment of a *prima facie* case.<sup>3</sup> Rather, Severn Trent and this court focused on whether sufficient evidence existed on which a reasonable juror could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for transferring and terminating Wimberly were pretextual and that age, sex, or gender was a determinative factor in Severn Trent's decisions.

**B. Transfer of Plaintiff Wimberly to EP&S Unit**

Through the testimony of Walsh,<sup>4</sup> Severn Trent articulated the legitimate, non-

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<sup>3</sup>Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court questions whether the plaintiff successfully established a *prima facie* case for each of its claims.

<sup>4</sup>Mr. Walsh was called as a witness in the plaintiff's case.

discriminatory business reasons for transferring Wimberly to the EP&S unit in July 2003. In the spring of 2003, Walsh and Mr. Isabell decided to dedicate a full-time purchasing person to EP&S to reduce the amount of purchasing done by the EP&S engineers. The hope was to free up the engineers and reduce the purchasing costs of the unit. Walsh recommended transferring Wimberly because he believed she was the best qualified person for the position based on her strong negotiation skills and her experience purchasing the EP&S line.

The only evidence that the plaintiff provided to support her claim that the transfer was related to her race and sex was her belief that Don Gerhart was equally qualified to handle the EP&S position.<sup>5</sup> Gerhart is a white male who worked under Wimberly in the Purchasing Department. As noted above, the plaintiff's disagreement with Severn Trent's business decision did not demonstrate pretext. See Langley v. Merck & Co., 04-3796, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10220, at \*12-14 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2005) (holding that plaintiff employee's disagreement with employer's decision does not prove pretext). Even if Gerhart was more qualified than Wimberly in purchasing for the EP&S unit, the fact that Walsh decided to transfer Wimberly instead of Gerhart did not equate to evidence of pretext. At most, it showed Walsh made an unwise choice.

In addition, to the extent that Wimberly attempted to illustrate that discrimination

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<sup>5</sup>Plaintiff also based her race discrimination claim on the simple fact that she was the only African American in the Purchasing Department and she was the only one transferred. That is not sufficient to establish pretext or allow a reasonable juror to conclude that race was a determinative factor in her transfer. All the other members of the Purchasing Department were not similarly situated.

was a determinative factor in her transfer by arguing that “similarly situated” Gerhart was treated more favorably, her efforts failed. See Jones, 198 F.3d at 413 (holding that a juror can infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action if the plaintiff shows that the “employer has treated more favorably similarly situated persons not within the protected class”). Gerhart was not a similarly situated employee in relation to Wimberly.<sup>6</sup> Wimberly was Gerhart’s manager. See Miller v. Del., 158 F. Supp. 2d 406, 411 (D. Del. 2001) (“In order for an employee to be considered similarly situated, for the purpose of showing disparate treatment in Title VII cases, the plaintiff must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation are nearly identical to those of the . . . employees whom he alleges were treated more favorably.” (citations and quotations omitted)). A manager is not similarly situated to her subordinates or to a non-manager. See Rader v. WEA Mfg., Inc., No. 3:01cv1998, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19122 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2003) (holding that a manager was not similarly situated to a non-management employee). See also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Employees in supervisory positions are

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<sup>6</sup>In my summary judgment motion memorandum, I noted that Gerhart and Wimberly were similarly situated. See Wimberly, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59938, at \*30 n.10. That finding was based on the summary judgment record in which the evidence showed that the plaintiff did not manage any of the purchasing employees despite her title and the respective purchasing duties of Gerhart and Wimberly in the Purchasing Department were not clear. In addition, I made that finding in considering the plaintiff’s *prima facie* case. See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that an “inference of discrimination anytime a single member of a non-protected group was allegedly treated more favorably than one member of the protected group . . . may be acceptable at the *prima facie* stage of the analysis”). The trial record was very different, the roles of Gerhart and Wimberly at Severn Trent were clarified, and my determination here relates to the plaintiff satisfying her burden of persuasion under the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.

generally deemed not to be similarly situated to lower level employees." ). Moreover, when Severn Trent transferred Wimberly to EP&S it resulted in her demotion, which is why the transfer qualified as an adverse employment action. It was not shown that a transfer to EP&S or the title of Senior Purchasing Agent would have equated to a demotion for Gerhart. The only fact that favored finding Gerhart and Wimberly similarly situated was that they both purchased for the EP&S unit before the plaintiff's transfer, but that was not enough to defeat the other differentiating circumstances that distinguished Severn Trent's treatment of them. See Anderson v. Haverford College, 868 F. Supp. 741, 745 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

Since Don Gerhart was older than plaintiff, she could not rely on him to prove her claim of age discrimination in her transfer to EP&S. The only evidence she produced to support her age discrimination claim involved a stray remark made by Walsh nine months before the transfer. In October 2002, Walsh said to Wimberly something to the effect that "its time for us to mentor someone younger and pass our knowledge on." Walsh made this comment to Wimberly in the context of teaching Tischler about Severn Trent's purchasing function. The comment had no relation to the plaintiff's transfer to EP&S or to her eventual termination.

It is well established that "[s]tray remarks by non-decisionmakers or decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision." Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr&

Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the comment at issue was made by the sole decision-maker in this case, but it was not related to the employment decision at issue. The comment was made nine months before the transfer and it related to the training of a colleague. Moreover, while the comment upset the plaintiff because she did not want to share her knowledge with Tischler, the remark itself contained very little, if any, discriminatory animus. It is a stretch to deem this comment age-based discrimination. In addition, courts in the Third Circuit have held that a lone remark made by a decision-maker several months before the allegedly discriminatory employment action, unrelated to the decision-making process, is insufficient to establish pretext. See Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that decision-maker's comment that "If you are getting too old for the job, maybe you should hire one or two young bankers" could not "reasonably be viewed as sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a determinative cause" in plaintiff's subsequent termination five months later); Osuala v. Cmty. Coll. of Phila., No. 00-98, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11609, at \*23-24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2000). And while a stray remark can be combined with other evidence to prove age-based animus, the plaintiff failed to put forward such other evidence with respect to her transfer and age discrimination claim. See Waldron v. SL Indus., 56 F.3d 491, 502 (3d Cir. 1995) ("We believe that the comment may be entitled to some weight when considered by the jury, although standing on its own it would likely be insufficient to demonstrate age-related animus. In other words, the comment is not

irrelevant, especially when coupled with [plaintiff's] other evidence . . . .”).

Accordingly, plaintiff Wimberly failed to produce any evidence from which a reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that Severn Trent's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for transferring her were pretextual. No reasonable juror could conclude that Wimberly age, race, or sex was a determinative (or even a motivating) factor in her transfer.

C. Elimination of Plaintiff Wimberly's Position

Walsh's testimony set forth Severn Trent's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the elimination of Wimberly's position in the EP&S unit. The company had decided to reduce its force due to an economic downturn in EP&S, which was expected to continue into the new fiscal year. In January of 2004, Severn Trent eliminated the positions of nine employees, including Ms. Wimberly's, in an effort to reduce costs. Mr. Walsh recommended eliminating Wimberly's position because he thought her duties could be assumed by existing employees. He also believed that the cost savings from the elimination of her salary would be greater than any savings she could provide through her purchasing duties. Ms. Wimberly was the only purchasing employee terminated in the reduction of force (RIF). Since the reduction in force, Severn Trent has not hired any new employees in the Purchasing Department or in EP&S.

Wimberly relied on a statement of Walsh in her attempt to discredit Severn Trent's reasons for the RIF and show pretext. In October 2002, fifteen months before her

termination, Walsh allegedly informed Wimberly that Severn Trent planned to sell, shut down, or reduce the size of the EP&S unit. Wimberly speculated that Mr. Walsh transferred her to EP&S knowing that her position would eventually be eliminated. Walsh's statement, however, carried little evidentiary weight. First, Walsh's comment itself was not evidence of discriminatory motive because it did not relate to Wimberly's age, race, or sex. Walsh was discussing the outlook of a division of Severn Trent. Second, Wimberly offered no evidentiary support for her claim that the statement was proof of a conspiracy to terminate her position. Walsh transferred Wimberly to the EP&S unit because he believed she could help the struggling division turn around. The statement bolsters Severn Trent's non-discriminatory reasons for transferring Wimberly because it shows EP&S was struggling for many months and a change in the unit's personnel and structure could help its financial picture. Finally, the EP&S unit was not sold or shut down. Rather, a RIF occurred due to the poor performance of the unit, but the RIF was not limited to the EP&S unit. Four of the nine positions eliminated were outside the EP&S unit. So Wimberly could not persuasively argue that her position would have been spared if she was never transferred to EP&S. In fact, Severn Trent's articulated reasons for Wimberly's termination — Wimberly's salary and the experience of the other members of the purchasing department — would have still existed if she remained in her previous position. Therefore, Walsh's statement did not show that the defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the elimination of Wimberly's position were pretextual.

Wimberly also attempted to show the elimination of her position was discriminatory by pointing to the members of the Purchasing Department that were not terminated. However, none of the other purchasing employees were similarly situated to the plaintiff because in January 2004 Wimberly was the only one working in the EP&S unit. The only purchasing employee that arguably could be considered similarly situated to Wimberly was Gerhart because of his experience with the EP&S unit. As for the race and sex claims, such an argument may be satisfactory to raise an inference of discrimination in her *prima facie* case, but it is insufficient to infer or prove intentional discrimination. Wimberly did not show that Severn Trent did anything other than choose one of its two purchasing employees to stay on during a financial pinch. Since the wisdom of the defendant's business choice was not at issue, Wimberly had to produce some evidence to link the decision to sex or race discrimination and she did not do that. And since Gerhart is older than Wimberly, his retention did not show pretext on the ADEA claim. See Tomasso v. Boeing, Co., 445 F.3d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing proving age discrimination in reduction of force cases and noting that “in a RIF, even qualified employees are laid off in order to reduce personnel” but “individuals may not be selected for layoff on the basis of age”); Anderson v. CONRAIL, 297 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that in an ADEA reduction of force case, a plaintiff must show that a similarly situated younger employee was retained).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The reasons I denied the defendant's summary judgment motion on the existing claims were not sufficient to defeat its Rule 50 motion. First, the testimony of Walsh thoroughly explained the voids in

Therefore, Wimberly failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that Severn Trent's non-discriminatory reasons for the elimination of her position were pretextual. Wimberly failed to demonstrate "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions" in Severn Trent's proffered reasons that a reasonable juror "could rationally find them unworthy of credence."

D. Relationship of Plaintiff Wimberly and Decision-maker Walsh

Finally, the history of Walsh and Wimberly's relationship and Walsh's pursuit and hiring of the plaintiff further prevented a reasonable juror from finding that Severn Trent intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on her age, race, or sex.

Walsh was responsible for hiring Wimberly at Gilbreth, their former employer. During the time that Wimberly worked for Walsh at Gilbreth, she enjoyed working for him and complained to him when she believed that another employee was discriminating against her. Once Walsh left Gilbreth to work for Severn Trent he contacted Wimberly on several occasions to recruit her to come work with him. When Wimberly decided to leave Gilbreth, she was offered a managerial position and a salary at another company. In

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the summary judgment record as to the business reasons for Wimberly's transfer and termination. And Wimberly was unable to display any inconsistencies or real weaknesses in these stated reasons. Second, at trial, Severn Trent provided a complete financial picture of EP&S, including legible financials, to support its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the transfer and termination. Third, several of the considerations in determining that inconsistencies existed in Severn Trent's proffered reasons were no more than my questioning the defendant's business decisions and "the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent." Jones, 198 F.3d at 413.

response, Walsh offered her a non-managerial position at Severn Trent and matched the other company's salary. Wimberly accepted Severn Trent's offer of employment because of her relationship with Walsh and his promise of a future managerial position, which he delivered.

In addition to pursuing Wimberly for the purchasing position in December 1998, Walsh acted in other ways that evidenced a respect and friendship with Wimberly, including inviting her to an open house at his personal residence, arranging for her to go on a date with a friend of his, and attending Wimberly's mother's burial.

Wimberly's only explanation for Walsh's past conduct was her bald assertion that looking back he really was discriminating against her all along. Without proof to support such a statement, the plaintiff could not destroy the strong persuasive weight of such evidence.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

Despite Walsh's years of actions that displayed a complete lack of discrimination towards Wimberly, Wimberly wanted to hold Severn Trent liable for Walsh's business decisions that unfortunately involved her position. However, she offered no evidence of intentional discrimination. Wimberly failed to show that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Severn Trent's transfer, demotion, and termination of her were pretextual. In short, based on the record before me at the close of the plaintiff's case, no reasonable juror could have found that it was more likely than not that a determinative

factor in Severn Trent's transfer and termination decisions involving Wimberly was the plaintiff's age, sex, and/or race. Accordingly, I granted Severn Trent's Rule 50 Motion and entered judgment as a matter of law in its favor with respect to all of the plaintiff's claims.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Lawrence F. Stengel  
LAWRENCE F. STENGEL, J.